greatly increased by the advent of sex-based classifications which are intended to alleviate the effects of past discrimination by granting certain advantages to women today. 2 In sharp contrast to the severe attitude generally taken towards classifications which disadvantage women, the current judicial tendency is to treat these new "ameliorative" ' practices quite favorably. The disparity in the treatment of these two types of classifications has been accomplished without any adequate explanation in terms of legal theory. It is the purpose of this Note to provide a full description of this important area of the law and to suggest a comprehensive theoretical model for evaluating classifications based on sex. In so doing, it will be necessary first to describe the currently available standards of review under the equal protection clause. It will next be shown that the courts have traditionally em- 1. Discrimination furthered by state action may be reached under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. When federal action is scrutinized, the appropriate provision is the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which has been held to include protections substantially the same as those afforded by the equal protection clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) .
2. This change has been felt most widely, and controversially, in the area of employment practices, where "affirmative action" programs granting preferences to women have been highly publicized. For a proposed legal analysis of such programs, see notes 122-28 infra and accompanying text.
3. The discussion in this Note will use "ameliorative" in a narrow sense as designating practices which remedy the effects of past discrimination. A comprehensive treatment of ameliorative classifications appears at notes 96-121 infra and accompanying text.
ployed the lowest of these standards (the rational basis test) to sexbased classifications, with the result that such classifications were almost always upheld. The Note will then discuss the recent transition to a stricter standard of review in sex discrimination cases. It will be argued that the courts are applying sub rosa the highest standard of review (the strict scrutiny test) to classifications which disadvantage women and that the application of this standard is theoretically proper.
The discussion will then shift to the recent cases which apparently have restored the rational basis test for ameliorative sex-based classifications.
This exemption of ameliorative classifications from stricter standards of review will be justified by a basic policy analysis of the equal protection clause. In conclusion, this Note will apply the proposed bifurcated test to several areas in which classifications are commonly made on the basis of sex.
THE THREE LEVELS OF REVIEW IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
Traditionally, governmental classifications have been upheld against equal protection attack whenever the distinctions have borne an arguable relationship (also called a "rational basis") to a legitimate public objective. 4 Typically, this objective was not required to have been the dominant motivating force in the minds of the legislators who enacted the provision, nor did it have to be demonstrated that the relationship of the distinction to the objective was grounded in fact.' Often, mere speculation on the part of the court as to -the existence of this relationship was enough to sustain the classification. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has developed a higher standard of review for classifications based upon either a "suspect" criterion such as race, 7 or a "fundamental" interest such as the exercise of a constitu-tional right. 8 Such distinctions will be upheld only if they serve a "compelling" state interest; 9 furthermore, strict scrutiny, to determine whether less restrictive alternatives can be used to achieve the same ends, 10 will be applied in examining the' asserted relationship of the classification to a legislative goal. In marked contrast to the extremely slight risk of judicial disapproval under the traditional standard," application of the newer test results in almost automatic invalidation. 12 After examining several recent Supreme Court cases, some commentators have suggested that a new standard is developing. 
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
view of women's proper role in society 2 ' or the need of the female sex for greater protection. 22 The Court proceeded on the assumption that there were vast differences between women and men, 2 3 with the result that the different treatment accorded the sexes could easily be found to have a rational connection to a legitimate public objective. RFv. 139 (1970) . This effect of "protective" legislation for women was not lost upon men. As the president of the International Cigarmakers Union explained in 1879: "We cannot drive the females out of the trade, but we can restrict this daily quota of labor through factory laws." Sedler, supra note 13, at 435 n.96, quoting A. HENRY, THE TRADE UNION MOvEMENr 129 (1923).
27. Similar legislation which established a maximum working day for bakers had previously been invalidated on due process grounds. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) . Perhaps Lochner can be distinguished on the basis that in Muller the court perceived a threat to women's health from long hours of work, while in Lochner no such threat to bakers' health was perceived.
28.
[S]he is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to [her brother] for protection; ... her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. 208 U.S. at 422.
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Court did not attempt to disguise its basic rationale that women were properly assigned a lesser role in the scheme of things:
[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present . . . . Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. 29 The Court was not always content to rest its decision on a consideration of women's proper roles; at times, more generalized dangers were seen as possibly arising from the removal of a restriction upon women. 21, 1975) , where the Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to that considered in Hoyt. In Taylor, the Court struck down the legislation on sixth and fourteenth amendment grounds. According to the majority, "We are also persuaded that the fair cross section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women . .. ." Id. at 4170. The Court distinguished Hoyt on the ground that it was not a sixth amendment case. Id. at 4171. However, the validity of this distinction is thrown in doubt when one considers that in Hoyt the statute was challenged by a female defendant convicted of murdering her husband, and surely the sixth amendment would apply. The Court seemed to recognize this when it stated: "[We cannot follow the contrary implications of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida. If it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long since passed." Id. One state court, for instance, accepted as a valid state objective the desire to protect an "island on the sea of life reserved for man '38 from the onslaught of female competitors. Taken as a whole, the older cases graphically illustrate the ineffectiveness of the permissive rational basis test in distinguishing classifications which might possibly have a legitimate basis from those which are due solely to the prejudiced attitudes of the legislators. 37. For an article delineating at great length the tenuous nature of some of the relationships between sex-discriminatory statutes and the questionable objectives involved, see Johnston & Knapp, supra note 33, at 728. As the authors stated, "Not only are many forms of sex discrimination vulnerable when subjected to 'rigid scrutiny, ' but they cannot even survive a serious application of the 'rational basis' test." Id.
38. State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 287, 300 P.2d 455, 458 (1956) (upholding conviction of a female for participating in a professional wrestling competition in violation of a state statute).
39. The court in Hunter, see note 38 supra and accompanying text, seems to have based its decision on the prejudicial attitudes of the legislators: "Mhe membership of the legislative assembly which enacted this statute was predominantly masculine. The fact is important in determining what the legislature might have had in mind with respect to this particular statute, in addition to its concern for the public weal." Id. at 287, 300 P.2d at 457-58. duty as a denial of equal protection. Clearly this statute could have been upheld on the same basis as was the statute in Hoyt. 44 However, the court distinguished Hoyt on the ground that in that case women were not totally excluded from jury service, whereas in White they were. The court went on to declare that in the instant case, the "exclusion of women from jury service . . . is arbitrary, ' 45 pointing out that jury service was a form of governmental participation. The case did not seem to apply the traditional rational basis test since the complete exclusion of women from jury service arguably furthers the goal of allowing them to fulfill their familial responsibilities, and hence the rational basis test would have been met. 4 6 Thus, it was unclear what theory had been used to invalidate the statute.
Two years later, another federal district court, in United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 47 struck down a statute under which women convicts received indefinite sentences whereas men received shorter fixed sentences. The court rejected the argument that the statute was reasonable under a minimal scrutiny test because women were sentenced to "rehabilitative farms" for indefinite periods long enough to reform them, while men, who supposedly were more incorrigible than women, received definite sentences. 48 Apparently, the court felt that the rational basis standard was inappropriate: "[I1t is difficult to find any reason why adult women, as one of the specific groups that compose humanity, should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group. 49 Since racial classifications are subject to the strict compelling state interest test, 5 " the court seemed to be implying that sex-based was decided only three states completely excluded women. Id. at 408 n.14. Currently no states completely exclude them. See note 33 supra.
44. The statute in Hoyt was upheld on the ground that women's familial responsibilities justified the exclusion. Such responsibilities could also justify a complete exclusion.
45 classifications should also be subject to such a standard. However, the court also specifically pointed out that the fundamental interest of liberty was at stake, 51 thereby confusing the issue as to the grounds of the decision-whether it was because a suspect classification or a fundamental interest was involved. The clearest departure from the traditional approach was the 1971 case of Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 2 where the California Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to the one upheld in Goesaert 53 on the ground, inter alia, 54 that it violated the equal protection clause. The Kirby court was the first which explicitly applied the strict scrutiny standard to a sex-based classification: "The instant case compels the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review, first, because the statute limits the fundamental right of one class of persons to pursue a lawful profession, and, second, because classifications based upon sex should be treated as suspect." 55 Hence, during the decade after Hoyt the state of the law with respect to sex-based classifications was one of change-although the Supreme Court had not yet deviated from its traditional stance, new attitudes on the part of society, the lower courts, and legislators were putting pressure on the Court to do so.
The 1971 case of Reed v. Reed 5 " presented the Supreme Court with an ideal opportunity to re-examine its approach to classifications by sex. In Reed, the Court unanimously invalidated a statute 7 which gave automatic preference to men over women in determining who should administer a decedent's estate. Unfortunately, the Court's explanation of its rationale was far from clear. The decision purported to apply the traditional rational basis test: "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of [ tive efficiency. In the Court's view, this was an "arbitrary legislative choice ' 9 and a denial of equal protection. This language was the most confusing aspect of the opinion, since the statute was not "arbitrary"
under a traditional rational basis analysis. The Court conceded that the purposes assigned to the statute were legitimate, and it is clearly arguable that these purposes were furthered by the legislation.°T he conclusion is inescapable that there was indeed a rational relationship between the classification and a permissible state objective. It would be difficult to imagine the Court's invalidating a statute which selected administrators by a noncontroversial criterion (for example, giving preference to the candidate whose birthdate came first in the calendar year). Hence, it would seem that the Court could have reached its decision in Reed only by importing some special protection for those disadvantaged by a classification based on sex. 61 Furthermore, it is apparent that this special protection did not result from using the new rationality scrutiny test, since this intermediate mhe apparent conformity of the Reed opinion to the model (of rationality scrutiny, see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying textj is thrown into doubt by the holding that the sex criterion was "arbitrary," It is difficult to understand that result without an assumption that some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis . . . . Even if the requirement be that the means bear a "significant relationship" to the state's purpose, or contribute substantially to its achievement, the test would seem to have been met in Reed. Only by importing some special suspicion of sex-related means from the new equal protection area can the result be made entirely persuasive. 63. The question of the efficacy of the statute appears nowhere in the opinion. Instead, after recognizing the legislative goals sought to be achieved by the statute, the Court summarily dismissed the subject with the epithet "arbitrary." See 404 U.S. at 76.
64. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 68. The fact that the results of categorization need not be clinically exact arises clearly from an examination of the leading cases which have applied the minimal scrutiny standard to sex-based classifications. In Muller, there were undoubtedly many women who would not have been injured by long working hours; in Goesaert, there was no showing that all women bartenders were more dangerous to good morals than all male bartenders; and in Hoyt, there were certainly many women who had no family respons ibilites. For a discussion of how closely a statute's effect must match the evil at which it is aimed (i.e., over and underinclusiveness) under the traditional, rational basis test, see generally Equal Protection Developments 1084-87. See also Note, supra note 10.
69. 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973). Despite the divergence of theories in the two cases, Robinson and Morris were both decided by the Sixth Circuit in the same year. [Vol. 1975:163 the minimal scrutiny standard in its pure form. Robinson rejected a challenge to a state university's dormitory curfew restrictions which were applicable only to women. Citing Reed for the proposition that the permissive rationality test is appropriate in sex discrimination cases, 70 the court refused to find a violation of the equal protection clause. Since the goal of the restrictions was the safety of women students, 7 ' the regulations' presumptive validity was not overcome merely by showing that different sets of rules applied to men and women. That Robinson represents a retreat from the heightened scrutiny of Reed and Morris is obvious. The classification in Robinson would appear to be no more reasonable than the ones in the earlier cases when one considers the lack of proof (1) that women who were not subject to dormitory curfews were exposed to more danger than those who were subject to such curfews or (2) that women unprotected by curfews were exposed to more danger than the men who were not so restricted. 72 Rather, the court seems to have based its decision on unfounded or untested assumptions about women in much the same manner as did the Courts in Muller, Goesaert, and Hoyt.
One recent case has interpreted Reed as an example of the new rationality scrutiny model. In Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District, 73 the Ninth Circuit explicitly applied this intermediate standard 74 in holding .that a selective public high school which applied an admissions quota of equal numbers for each sex violated the equal protection clause where such a policy resulted in higher entrance standards for girls. 75 According to the court, Reed indicated "that sex classifications are to be tested on the basis of strict rationality, a standard of review requiring the government (state or federal) to produce evidence that the challenged classification furthers the central purpose of the classifier. 75. This difference amounted to a 3.50 grade point average on a four-point scale for admission of girls and a 3.25 grade point average for boys. This policy kept 133 girls from being admitted who would have been admitted if equal criteria had been used. Since the high school involved was a special college preparatory school which offered significantly more courses and resources than other high schools in the district, this imposed a considerable hardship on those denied admission. Opening Brief for Appellants at 7-8, 24, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
76. 501 F.2d at 1269.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1975:163 because the school failed to prove that since boys overtake girls aca- 85. Two other recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the sex-discrimination issue, at least tangentially, but neither of them is directly on point. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), involved a suit by two pregnant public school teachers who challenged mandatory unpaid leave rules. However, the holding which struck down these regulations was based on due process rather than equal protection. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) , held that where California's disability insurance program exempted from coverage any work loss due to normal pregnancy, there was no denial of equal protection. However, in the Court's view, this program did not discriminate on the basis of sex since, 'There was no risk from which men are protected and women are not.' Id. at 496-97 n.20. Because the cases concerning pregnancies are not simply sex-discrimination cases, but involve something more, this Note will not discuss them in depth.
86 Furthermore, an examination of the policies giving rise to the theory of suspect classifications will show the desirability of including sexual classifications in this group. 91 This doctrine requires that a discrete group in society should not be singled out for invidious treatment merely on the basis of traditional, stereotyped notions. 92 Politically impotent, these groups are generally characterized by features with which they were born and which they cannot change. 9 3 Prejudice concerning these groups becomes embodied in legislation, often not because of the desire to achieve a proper governmental objective, but because of popular beliefs as to the inferiority and "differentness" of the members of the groups. [ Vol. 1975:163 as it is indeed true that they have been a politically powerless group, singled out for a legislative treatment which in effect keeps them in an inferior status and is often based on traditional notions of sexual roles and capabilities. 95 Because of the strong policy reasons for applying the highest standard of review in sex discrimination cases, it is inappropriate either to continue the automatic validation of discriminatory statutes under the minimal rationality test or to subject this area of the law to the vagaries of the rationality scrutiny test with its heavy emphasis upon the fact-gathering abilities of counsel. 96. It should be clearly understood that an ameliorative classification is not simply one that is favorable towards women. Rather, it is one which improves women's position, and in this context, it is one which alleviates the effects of past discrimination. WEBsrEr's Tn NEw INTERNATIONAL DIrCONARY (1961) defines ameliorate as "to make better: improve." The opinion in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), seemed to recognize this definition when it said:
And in Frontiero the plurality opinion also noted that the statutes there were "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against women. On the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group-women-who have historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on additional economic disadvantages." Id. at 355 n.8 (citation omitted Court rejected the contention that a better means of achieving this goal should be required, thus explicitly refusing to apply the less restrictive alternative requirement of the strict scrutiny test.0 1 0 Kahn, then, rejected the proposition -that ameliorative classifications based on sex are unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny standard in that they are not based on a compelling state interest, a viewpoint urged by the dissenters in that case.
1 0 2 Neither did Kahn decide that such classifications, although subject to strict scrutiny, are justified by a compelling state interest. The highest level of equal protection review was simply not applied at all. Furthermore, it is evident that the new rationality scrutiny test was not used. The Court made no attempt to determine the efficacy of the exemption in achieving the desired objective of equalizing the financial positions of widows and widowers, nor was the state required to come forward with evidence on this point. However, Kahn should not be taken as having restored the minimal scrutiny standard for all sex-based classifications. In endorsing the statute's purpose of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss only for widows, the Court recognized that women generally have not earned as much money as men and that such differences in income have frequently resulted from sex discrimination. 0 3 Frontiero was distinguished explicitly on this basis. In Frontiero, the classification was "solely for administrative convenience"' 0 whereas in Kahn the distinction was imposed for the purpose of aiding widows in their financial plight, due in part to past discrimination. The clear implication is that the rational basis standard is appropriate for reviewing those sex-based 101. Id. at 356 n.1O. Indeed, if the Court had applied this requirement, it is clear that it would not have been met, for lack of a showing either that all widows are more impecunious than all widowers or that all widows who pay property taxes are in financial need. A more narrowly drawn statute would have been necessary to reach only those widows who were financially disadvantaged.
102. In one dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall claimed: "The statute nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements of equal protection, since the State has not borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest could not be achieved by a more precisely tailored statute or by use of feasible less drastic means." Id. at 360 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice White also dissented: "There is merit in giving poor widows a tax break, but gender-based classifications are suspect and require more justification than the State has offered." Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
103. There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other state exceed those facing the man. Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid job . (2), the number of an individual's elapsed years is the number of calendar years after 1950 (or, if later, the year in which he attained age 21) and before-(A) in the case of a woman, the year in which she died or, if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which she attained age 62, (B) in the case of a man who has died, the year in which he died, or if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which he attained age 65, or (C) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring after 1960 in which he attained (or would attain) age 65. Another successor case to Kahn is People v. Elliot," 5 where the Colorado Supreme Court held that a criminal statute imposing the obligation for child support solely on the father did not violate the equal protection clause. In applying the rational basis test, the court relied upon the fact that men's economic advantages made them generally better able than women to cope with the burden of child support. As in Kahn, the exemption of women from a pecuniary obligation was justified by the continuing effects of unequal opportunities in the economic area.
The proposition that men generally are more economically favored and, therefore, better able to support their children, is not entirely an obsolete concept. In April of this year the United States Supreme Court gave judicial notice to -this view in sustaining a five hundred dollar property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers, It is therefore clear that Kahn, Ballard, and the subsequent lower court decisions' 17 show a judicial willingness to exempt ameliorative classifications from the sub rosa strict scrutiny test of Reed. This exemption is well founded since the policy reasons for imposing a strict standard of review" 18 simply do not apply when the distinction based on sex alleviates the effects of past discrimination. 1 9 Strict scrutiny of classifications which disadvantage women is appropriate because of women's traditionally inferior political and economic status, which in turn derives from stereotyped ideas concerning their capabilities. In contrast, the very purpose of ameliorative classifications is to help remove the effects of such stereotyped treatment. These classifications are designed to place women in the position which they would have occupied but for -the past discrimination. 20 Requiring strict scrutiny in such cases would be self-defeating, since the effect would be to aid in perpetuating the only sex-related status which satisfies the policy reasons for strict review. A similar policy analysis will show that Kahn and its successors have properly used the rational basis test in judging the constitutionality of ameliorative classifications. No other test would be consistent with the basic principle of the equal protection clause--to treat those who are similarly situated in a similar manner.' 2 -Because of the continuing effects of sexual bias, men and women are not similarly situated. Since an ameliorative classification treats men differently from women only in order to overcome the barriers of past discrimination so that they can become similarly situated with men, it serves to further the aim of equal protection. Ely's thesis is that certain classifications based on race which favor Blacks are constitutional and are to be judged under a lenient standard of review: "Rather than asserting that the demands of 'special scrutiny' can be met. . . I shall suggest that 'special scrutiny' is not appropriate when White people have decided to favor Black people at the expense of White people." Id. at 727. Ely's reasoning is based on the idea that the policy arguments for labeling a criterion such as race to be suspect do not apply in the reverse case.
relevant inquiry is whether a challenged classification is reasonably related to its ameliorative purpose. Invidious sex-based classifications cannot rely on this rationale and are therefore subject to a stricter standard.
THE IMPACT OF THE BIFURCATED TEST
Once it has been determined that the new bifurcated standard is the appropriate one for sex-based classifications, the remaining question is the effect which explicit recognition of the new test should have in those areas where distinctions on the basis of sex are most commonly drawn.
Employment
Discriminatory employment practices have been the focus of much attention. Those which are the result of governmental action must be justified in terms of equal protection standards. 12 2 Under the proposed test, most of the practices currently described as "female protective laws"' 23 would be unconstitutional. These laws typically provide for maximum hours of labor, minimum wages, and restrictions on working conditions under which women may be employed. Such regulations generally disadvantage women by restricting their employment opportunities and cannot be said to have as their aim the elimination of past discriminatory effects. Hence, they would receive strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Few of these statutes would meet such a standard. Although the protection of women from extremely taxing physical work might possibly be a compelling interest, these "protective" statutes are seldom so narrowly drawn. 124 The most controversial issue in this field is the use of affirmative action programs which remedy employment discrimination by giving preferred treatment to women in the hiring, transfer, and promotion processes.' 2 5 Since those contracting with the government are encouraged by executive order 1 8 to implement such programs in order to ensure that there are no discriminatory employment practices, affirmative action programs will become increasingly common. The recent case of Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. 127 presented a challenge to an affirmative action program in which the employer, in order to remedy past discrimination in pay, job classifications, and promotions, gave priority to black and female employees over white male employees having less seniority but higher job classifications. Although the action was brought under Title VII, the court's discussion of the program's ameliorative character would be equally valid in an equal protection analysis: "The relief is warranted, however, where past discrimination has allowed those persons greater job opportunity than more senior blacks and females. 1 28 Therefore, the court sustained the program. Patterson exemplifies the proper treatment under the bifurcated test for affirmative programs designed to eliminate discrimination. Clearly these programs are ameliorative; thus, they would be subject to the rational basis test and would be sustained as long as they arguably worked to alleviate past effects of discrimination. However, this analysis would not permit unlimited favoritism of women employees. Presumably, a level could be reached where -the preferences could not be justified in terms of removing past discriminatory effects. Such classifications would fail for lack of a reasonable relationship to the purpose of amelioration.
Selective Service
Another highly publicized issue is how women's exemption from the draft should be treated. Although personnel are not now being drafted, the draft along with the equal protection problem, may be resurrected at some future time. Clearly this exemption benefits women. Furthermore, all decisions which have dealt with this situation under the equal protection clause 129 have sustained the Selective The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship.
Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1974). Service Act. 130 A typical example of the judicial reasoning on this point is United States v. St. Clair' where the court maintained: "In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary service for women, Congress followed the teachings of history that if a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning.' 3 2 However, under the proposed test, a different decision would be required. Since the statute does not tend to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, it is not ameliorative; hence, an application of strict scrutiny is necessary. It is clear that the draft mechanism does not satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement of the strict scrutiny standard, since -the classification is both underinclusive and overinclusive. Men who have familial responsibilities are not included in the exemption whereas women who do not have such responsibilities are nevertheless exempted. A more narrowly drawn statute would allow both men and women who wish to obtain an exemption on the ground of maintaining an orderly domestic life to apply for such an exemption and to have the merits of their claims evaluated. Furthermore, most military personnel today are not in combat positions, and warfare is becoming increasingly technological. Because of the resulting decrease in the importance of physical strength in the modern military, it is doubtful that a compelling state interest for the draft exemption could be found.'
CONCLUSION
The proposed test for sex-based classifications has as its basic rationale the elimination of any invidious discrimination based on sex, whether this discrimination is caused by ongoing practices or is simply the effect of past practices. In order -to implement this policy, the test
